Homeland Security is Seeking "Electronic Nose" Technology for Biological Threat Detection

    Dogs have been used by law enforcement for tracking and detection for generations.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently sought to compile all available information on the electronic equivalent of a dog's nose.  The inquiry was part of a larger effort to assess the pros and cons of actual canine use in biological detection as well as the state of the art in "electronic nose" technology.  The program is spelled out in a Sources Sought document from DHS's Office of the Chief Procurement Officer:

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs (OHA), has reached out to DHS S&T for assistance with technology foraging related to the use of canines for detection of biological threats. Despite countless past research efforts, there currently still does not exist an "electronic nose" that can rival a well-trained canine for detection of vapor signatures. The electronic sensoring community understands that the development of an "electronic nose", modeled after a canine olfactory system, would provide a leap-ahead sensing technology.

    DHS is only looking for information at this point and does not intend to make any purchases or award any contracts.  Respondents were encouraged to submit "white papers" or Powerpoint presentations on "past and current research and development (R&D) efforts or commercial off the shelf products in the area of 'electronic noses'; past and current efforts focused on using canines as potential detection solutions; canine training services; and canine maintenance requirements."
    This source gathering effort was, in their words, part of the DHS's "quest to make America safer."  To that end, DHS made it clear that all applicable information was welcome:

If a source does not have specific information applicable to detection of biological materials but has information regarding use of canines for detection of other materials (chemical, explosive, narcotics) and feels that the information is transferable to the detection of biomaterials, that information would also be of interest.

    In the past, other government agencies have sought to make use of not only an "electronic nose," but an "electronic tongue," as well.  These were for use in food and beverage testing and evaluation, however, not in connection with law enforcement or threat detection.

GAO: ‘Visa Overstay’ Backlog at DHS Remains Over One Million

    Visa overstays by visitors to the United States received attention recently amid reports that some students from Kazakhstan linked to the Boston bombing suspects remained in the U.S. despite invalid or expired student visas.  Tuesday, the Government Accountability Office issued a report of preliminary finding on the progress the Department of Homeland Security has made in its efforts to reduce the backlog of such visa issues.  Although almost 863,000 records were "closed" in the last two years, the backlog of potential overstays remains at more than one million [emphasis added]:

In the summer of 2011, DHS reviewed the 1.6 million potential overstay records. As a result, DHS closed about 863,000 records and removed them from the backlog. Since that time, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns. However, as of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS. GAO's preliminary analysis identified nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa constitute 44 percent of unmatched arrival records, while tourists admitted under a visa waiver constitute 43 percent. The remaining records include various types of other nonimmigrants, such as those traveling on temporary worker visas.

    The report does note a change implemented since the Boston bombing related specifically to student visas:

Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against departure records and determine whether student visa holders who have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the terms of their stay. Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials, these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being admitted into the United States.

    DHS has yet to comply with federal law requiring reporting of visa overstays, but the GAO notes that Janet Napolitano has said that DHS intends to begin such reporting by the end of the year:

Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessors have not regularly done so since 1994. In September 2008, GAO reported on limitations in overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data and that, as a result, DHS could not reliably report overstay rates. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013.

Note: A version of this article appeared first at The Weekly Standard. 

Border Security: Apprehensions versus Attempted Crossings

    In mid-February, Homeland (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano and Delaware Senator Tom Carper visited Arizona to observe border security operations at the well known Mariposa Port of Entry.  Carper chairs the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and he conducted the tour with Napolitano as part of his committee's oversight function.  Napolitano and Carper issued a joint statement after the trip that included this claim about a precipitous drop in attempted illegal border crossings during the first four years of the Obama administration:

Over the past four years, the Obama Administration, working together with Congress, has dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources to the Southwest border, and undertaken an unprecedented effort to transform our nation's immigration enforcement systems into one that focuses on public safety, border security, and the integrity of the immigration system.  

Attempts to cross the border illegally, as measured by U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions, totaled nearly 365,000 nationwide in FY 2012, representing a nearly 50 percent decrease since FY 2008 and a 78 percent decrease from their peak in FY 2000.

    The key phrase is "as measured by U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions."  Since attempted crossings are, of course, impossible to track accurately, this statement makes the assumption that attempts mirror apprehensions - in other words, attempts are only counted if those crossing are caught.  Not only is this highly improbable, it opens the door for manipulation of the numbers or even manipulation of enforcement efforts themselves.  Lax enforcement of border security would result in lower apprehensions and therefore lower reported attempts when in fact the lax enforcement would likely result in a higher success rate for those attempting to enter the U.S. illegally.

    This apprehensions-equals-attempts formula is counterproductive and probably misleading.  Looking at airport security as a parallel, if the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were to see a decrease in the number of weapons being carried into airplanes, that would not automatically mean fewer attempts were being made to carry weapons on board.  On the contrary, it may indicate more success by violators in hiding such weapons, a decline in thoroughness by TSA personnel, or lack of effective search techniques to find new varieties of more easily hidden weapons.  Any solace gained from a report of a decline in weapons seizures by the TSA apart from other factors to explain the decline would be rather cold comfort.

    Not only does this proxy method suffer from practical and logical fallacies, the DHS has itself disavowed its validity as recently as 2011.  In a July 2011 DHS Fact Sheet, a section entitled "Defining Border Apprehensions" says the following [emphasis added]:

Apprehension data collected by DHS represent events, not individuals. The total number of apprehensions during a specific period will be greater than the total number of unique individuals apprehended because some individuals will have been apprehended more than once. The relationship between the number of border apprehensions to either the number of attempted illegal entries or the number of successful illegal entries is unknown. 

    The same document goes on to note that the "decrease in apprehensions ... may be due to a number of factors including changes in U.S. economic conditions and border enforcement efforts." The statement from Napolitano and Carper was silent on economic and other possible factors.

    Another problem presented by this proxy method of counting attempts is the implications for the other statistics quoted later in the press release:

Additionally, from FY 2009 to 2012, CBP and ICE seized 71 percent more currency, 39 percent more drugs, and 189 percent more weapons along the Southwest border as compared to FY 2005 to 2008.

    Applying the earlier logic, this would mean drug traffic across the border increased by 39 percent, and weapons traffic increased a whopping 189 percent.  Those would not be statistics that DHS would be anxious to report using the apprehensions-equals-attempts formula. But by choosing to tout success in reducing attempted border crossing with a dubious methodology, the DHS has inadvertently implied those disturbing conclusions.

    None of this amounts to direct evidence that the DHS is manipulating statistics or that the results derived from the numbers are somehow wildly inaccurate.  But at a time when the Obama administration is seeking to push through "comprehensive immigration reform," demonstrating a secure border, a pre-condition to immigration reform for many on the right, is certainly in its interest.  The apprehensions-equals-attempts proxy does not provide the assurance that the secure border pre-condition has been met.

Homeland Only Fully Approves 10% of Freedom of Information Requests

According to an annual report for 2012 just released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS processed a total of 205,895 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests during the year. The report, presented by Acting Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer Jonathan R. Cantor, shows that DHS reduced the backlog of such requests by 30 percent during the year. However, a deeper look at the numbers reveals that the agency only fully granted just over 10 percent of FOIA requests that were processed.

Here are the figures from Table B (1) in the report:

205,895 – Total requests processed
21,715 – Full grants
118,719 – Number of partial grants/partial denials
65,461 – Number of full denials (Exemptions/Other)

The percentages break down this way:

32% Fully Denied (although more than half of the denials were due to “no records” or “improper FOIA request”)
89.5% Fully or Partially Denied
10.5% Fully Granted

The report also states that the federal agency employees almost 400 people just to deal with FOIA requests.

Also noted in the report is that freedom of information isn’t free. Costs associates with processing FOIA requests, including almost $2,000,000 for litigation, were $38,633,002 during 2012. Only $435,890 in fees was collected to offset these costs.

The Department of Homeland Security is led by Secretary Janet Napolitano.


Note: This article first appeared on February 5, 2013 at The Weekly Standard.