Intel Official: Three Biggest National Security Threats Are Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda

    Addressing a Center for Strategic and International Studies forum Tuesday, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Michael G. Vickers detailed a laundry list of national security threats that the United States faces today, the American Forces Press Services reports, including:

...several permutations of al-Qaida and its affiliates, homegrown violent extremists, unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, Russian revanchism, cyber threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

    But when it came to naming the top three threats, al Qaeda swept the rankings:

"But the three biggest threats are al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula -- centered in Yemen -- and the growing al-Qaida threat in Syria and al-Qaida's affiliates, … who are spread elsewhere and who are taking advantage of what we call metastasization … across the Middle East and North Africa. … And so this really remains job one for the intelligence community and our special operations forces," he told the audience. 

    Vickers repeated the Obama administration's contention that "core" al Qaeda has been severely degraded, but he acknowledged that even that core group remains a viable threat:

"While we've had a lot of success in severely degrading the Al-Qaida core in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, they continue to pose a threat, in particular a [constitutional] threat down the road," Vickers said.

    Vickers noted that the war in Syria has presented a particular challenge as it is "giving rise to a significant terrorism threat[.]" The complicating factor is that while the Obama administration is seeking to support the opposition, the opposition finds itself in de facto alliance with al Qaeda linked groups who also oppose Bassar Assad's government.
    A report in Wednesday's Wall Street Journal underscores Vicker's warnings. According to the Journal, the Rand Corporation will release a report on Thursday showing the "number of [global jihadist] groups increasing by more than 50% and the estimated number of militants doubling." The war in Syria is said to be responsible for the greatest growth in recent years with "more than half of the number of al Qaeda-sympathizing jihadists world-wide" located in Syria.
    Undersecretary Vickers also alluded to the continuing challenge of balancing the risks and rewards of intelligence, an issue that has caused a number of headaches for President Obama throughout his tenure:

Intelligence is a significant source of advantage for the United States. … It's an advantage that's very important to us, but it's also one that has to be used aggressively, but also prudently, to make sure we're helping our leaders solve problems and not adding to their problems," Vickers said.

Note: A version of this post first appeared at The Weekly Standard. 

State Dept. in January: Giving in to Terrorist Demands 'Perpetuates the Action' of Kidnappings

    Time Magazine is reporting that, during an interview about the deal to trade Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban detainees from Guantanamo, when "[a]sked whether the Taliban would be inspired by the exchange to kidnap others, a commander laughed. 'Definitely.'" The response should not come as a surprise to the Obama administration given an exchange that took place at a State Department press briefing in January of this year.
    A reporter asked spokesperson Jen Psaki about a UN resolution to discourage private companies from paying ransom to terrorists for the release of kidnap victims. The reporter said that "basically, these companies paying a ransom through their own insurance is really one of the only ways that we’ve seen success of release of these kidnapping victims." Despite the apparent "success", Psaki told the reporter that giving in to the terrorists' demands simply "perpetuates the action":

MS. PSAKI: Well, our concern is, as I mentioned, the – what this perpetuates, which is the fact that terrorists kidnap people and they have raised well over $120 million in ransom payments. So the belief here, clearly, by the UN Security Council, but the United States, is that this is not an approach that can continue because it perpetuates the action. But beyond that, I’d have to check with our team and see if there’s more specifics on it.

    The Washington Posts has reported that early in the Bergdahl ordeal, the Taliban's demands for his release included "$1 million and 21 Afghan prisoners." Spokesperson Marie Harf could not confirm or deny this week whether or not cash payments were considered as part of the deal as executed by the Obama administration last week when five Taliban commanders released into Qatari custody. But in the January press briefing, Psaki warned against not just ransom, but "concessions" as well [emphasis added]:

So we commend the consensus adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2133 on kidnapping for ransom, which identifies kidnapping for ransom as a source of terrorist financing and expresses the Council’s determination to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions... 

The resolution is also directly in line with the United States longstanding policy to make no concessions.

 However, this week, Harf would not concede that releasing the five detainees even amounted to a concession:

QUESTION: Well, it’s just – it’s very general, but it relates to this. When people are saying the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorist groups, is that statute or is that general policy? And -- 

MS. HARF: Well, our line is that we don’t make concessions -- 

QUESTION: That’s what I was about to ask you. 

MS. HARF: -- which is different. I mean, that’s the – you’re quoting it colloquial. That’s actually not what you’ll hear us say from the podium (inaudible). 

QUESTION: Okay. And how do you define the difference? 

MS. HARF: How do we define the difference? Well, I -- 

QUESTION: Between making concessions and negotiating. 

MS. HARF: I think it’s clear that we don’t make concessions to terrorists. And that’s a judgment, right, that we don’t – I think – I don’t know. I think those words, using Matt, I think are fairly well defined. 

QUESTION: So releasing five of their prisoners or five of their -- 

MS. HARF: Is not making a concession. 

QUESTION: It’s not a concession? 

MS. HARF: No. It is consistent absolutely with what’s happened in previous wars, including Korea, including Vietnam. I think one of the large tranches of prisoners in Vietnam, it was something like around 500 Americans for 1,200 North Vietnamese. So again, this has a long history in the United States of prisoner swaps.

Note: A version of this post first appeared at The Weekly Standard. 

Kerry: Poverty is "Root Cause of Terrorism" in "Many Cases"

    Secretary of State John Kerry covered a broad range of topics with his counterpart Pietro Parolin at the Vatican in Rome on Monday.  Besides Syria, the Middle East peace process, Sudan and Cuba, the subject of poverty came up during their discussions.  In remarks following the meeting, Kerry linked poverty to not only terrorism, but to the "disenfranchisement of millions" [emphasis added]:

We talked about the common interest of Pope Francis and President Obama in addressing poverty and extreme poverty on a global basis. The United States of America is deeply involved in efforts in Africa and in other parts of the world – in Asia, South Central Asia – to address this poverty, as is the Catholic Church. And so we have a huge common interest in dealing with this issue of poverty, which in many cases is the root cause of terrorism or even the root cause of the disenfranchisement of millions of people on this planet.

     Kerry's statement echoes comments he made in October 2013 at the Global Counterterrorism Forum after terrorist attacks in both Nairobi, Kenya, and Peshawar, Pakistan: "Getting this right isn’t just about taking terrorists off the street. It’s about providing more economic opportunities for marginalized youth at risk of recruitment."


Note: A version of this article first appeared at The Weekly Standard.

Not 'Decimated': FBI Director Calls Al Qaeda 'Top Terrorist Threat to the Nation'

    The message regarding terrorism from the Obama administration over the past few years has been that al-Qaeda is on the run, its core leadership has been "decimated," and that the face of the "war on terror" is changing.  In his recent speech on U.S. counterterrorism strategy, President Obama said, "Core al Qaeda is a shell of its former self.  Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al Qaeda will pose a credible threat to the United States."  However, remarks on Thursday by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller to the House Committee on the Judiciary seem to paint a less optimistic picture [emphasis added]:

Overseas, the terrorist threat is similarly complex and ever-changing. We are seeing more groups and individuals engaged in terrorism, a wider array of terrorist targets, greater cooperation among terrorist groups, and continued evolution and adaptation in tactics and communication. 

Al Qaeda and its affiliates, especially al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), continue to represent a top terrorist threat to the nation. These groups have attempted several attacks on the United States, including the failed Christmas Day airline bombing in 2009 and the attempted bombing of U.S.-bound cargo planes in October of 2010. 

In December 2011, Somali national Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame pled guilty to nine counts of providing material support to AQAP and al Shabaab. A Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation found that Warsarme conspired to teach terrorists how to make bombs, provided explosives weapons and training to al Shabaab, and arranged for al Shabaab leaders to obtain weapons from members of AQAP. Warsame faces up to life in prison.

    Director Mueller also spoke of the "continuing threat from homegrown violent extremists" as seen in the Boston marathon bombing, and the "growing scope of the insider threat" posing risks to national security, illustrated by Chinese national Steve Liu, an employee of a New Jersey defense contractor sentenced in March to five years in prison for stealing designs on U.S. weapons systems.


Note: This article first appeared at The Weekly Standard.

The Seeds of the Benghazi Talking Points

    Last week, the Benghazi talking points took center stage in the ongoing investigation of the 9/11 anniversary attacks in Libya.  Jay Carney came under intense questioning at Friday's White House press briefing as he struggled to justify the dozen iterations of talking points before Susan Rice used the final version for her now-infamous five Sunday talk show appearances on September 16, 2012.  However, a background briefing by the State Department four days before Rice's appearances provides the earliest extended look at the information used to prepare those talking points.
    On September 12, in the evening following the attacks, three unnamed Senior Administration* officials briefed journalists via teleconference on the rapidly developing story.  Although President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton had already made some public statements, this briefing contained far more detail than any previous remarks.  As the teleconference commenced, the most striking part about it was is the complete absence of any mention of "protests" or "demonstrations":

So let me give you a little bit of the chronology to the best of our knowledge. Again, the times are likely to change as it becomes a little bit more precise, but this is how we’ve been able to reconstruct what we have from yesterday.
At approximately 4 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time yesterday, which was about 10 p.m. in Libya, the compound where our office is in Benghazi began taking fire from unidentified Libyan extremists. By about 4:15, the attackers gained access to the compound and began firing into the main building, setting it on fire...

     Later in the briefing, a journalist asks a question about protests [emphasis added]:

QUESTION: ...[T]he larger question is, you didn’t talk at all about the protests. You started your timeline with that the firing began. Can you talk about the timeline of when the protests started, how that fit in with it, and your sense of whether or not the protestors and the assailants were the same?...
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: ...With regard to the protests – I assume you’re not talking about protests in Cairo, are you? You’re talking about protests in Benghazi?... We frankly don’t have a full picture of what may have been going on outside of the compound walls before the firing began. So I really just don’t have any specifics on that at the moment. I apologize.

    It is apparent that the idea of protests at Benghazi had not yet even entered into the discussion at the State Department.  The official in fact clarifies that the questioner is not referring to the protests outside the Cairo Embassy which of course had dominated the news the previous day.  Another journalist raised the Cairo protests again later in the briefing:

QUESTION: ...Do you believe that this attack was in any way related to the incident in Cairo? You suggested this attack in Benghazi was more complex; so is it safe to rule out that this was a reaction to the inflammatory internet video?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: ...With regard to whether there is any connection between this internet activity and this extremist attack in Benghazi, frankly, we just don’t know. We’re not going to know until we have a chance to investigate. And I’m sorry that it is frustrating for you that so many of our answers are “We don’t know,” but they are truthful in that.

    Again, when given the opportunity to connect the Cairo protests with Benghazi and the anti-Muhammad video, the State Department official referred to the lack of "any connection between this internet activity and this extremist attack in Benghazi," not "the protests in Benghazi."  This complete absence of "protests" or "demonstrations" in the State Department's discussion of Benghazi makes the revision in the talking points (via Foreign Policy) changing "attacks" in the first version to "demonstrations" in the third version even more curious.
    A second point of contention regarding the talking point revisions relates to the spontaneous versus planned nature of the attacks and the participation of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates.  Andrea Mitchell raised this question early in the briefing:

QUESTION: ...there’s a lot of reporting now on this being linked to a terror attack, an organized terror attack – possibly al-Qaida sympathetic or al-Qaida linked. Can you speak to that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: ... Frankly, we are not in a position to speak any further to the perpetrators of this attack. It was clearly a complex attack. We’re going to have to do a full investigation. We are committed to working with the Libyans both on the investigation and to ensure that we bring the perpetrators to justice. The FBI is already committed to assisting in that, but I just – we’re – it’s just too early to speak to who they were and if they might have been otherwise affiliated beyond Libya.

    As the administration has stressed in defense of the early statements, the official declined to confirm or deny the suspected participation of al-Qaeda groups.  In fact, Mitchell's question contains the only reference to al-Qaeda or "terror" in the entire briefing, and yet the first version of the talking points prepared by the CIA included multiple references to al-Qaeda and its affiliates.  This is perhaps an early indication of the differences between the State Department and the CIA that would eventually lead to the twelve revisions in the following days.
    Regardless, the State Department official did note that "[i]t was clearly a complex attack."  In fact, "attack" or "attackers" is used twelve times throughout the briefing.  By contrast, in reference to Benghazi, "protest", "demonstration", and "spontaneous" are not used at all.
    A third and final point raised over the talking point revisions was the removal of references to prior attacks in Libya in the months leading up to September 11.  A questioner raised the issue of prior security incidents at the briefing:

QUESTION: ...Listen, there’ve been troubles in Benghazi for some time now. I understand the Consulate was attacked or bombed two, three months ago. The British have put out threat warnings about Benghazi. Was there any consideration before the attack yesterday of beefing up security there? 

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ONE: Well, again, I’m not going to get into the specifics of how we were postured in terms of security at our mission in Benghazi beyond what I said. So – because we don’t ever talk about the details of those kinds of things.
What I would say, though, is that we did, as we did in missions around the world, review the security there in the context of preparing for the anniversary of September 11th. And at that point, there was no information and there were no threat streams to indicate that we were insufficiently postured.

    Although the official stated that "we did, as we did in missions around the world, review the security there in the context of preparing for the anniversary of September 11th," an overview of State Department warnings and alerts shows a clear drop off between 2011 and 2012 in 9/11 anniversary warnings.
    After the background briefing on September 12 and over the next three days, the information the administration had presented in this briefing was combined with new information that continued to be gathered by intelligence and other agencies and ultimately led to the talking points used by Susan Rice.  It was also during this time, as reported this week by The Weekly Standard, that the Overseas Security Advisory Council withdrew a report that had been issued on September 6, five days before the attack, entitled "Terrorism and Important Dates."  The report downplayed the likelihood of a 9/11 anniversary-date attack by al-Qaeda or other terror groups, noting that concerns over such attacks are often due to "increased media attention to the issue."  A State Department official contacted via email said the report was withdrawn because "the content had expired," and did not respond to requests for further clarification.
    The removal of references to prior security incidents from the talking points and the withdrawal of the Terrorism and Important Dates report suggests that the administration was not inclined to draw attention to its pre-Benghazi posture on diplomatic security and preparedness.  Indeed, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland wrote in an email, such reminders "could be abused by members [of Congress] to beat up the State Department for not paying attention to warnings, so why would we want to feed that either?"
    Clearly the information during the first few days and even weeks after the Benghazi attacks was incomplete and even contradictory.  But in retrospect, it is clear that the Obama administration understood almost from the beginning the politically vulnerable position it was in due to its actions (and inaction) before, during, and as soon became apparent, after the attacks.  The clear frustration of the White House press corps during Friday's press briefing with Jay Carney may be another sign that the concerns over the last eight months of mainly conservatives and Republicans are beginning to spread.  Even Democrats at the Benghazi congressional hearings on Wednesday were openly calling for additional hearings to resolve the many remaining unanswered questions of Benghazi and the deaths of four Americans.  The coming weeks and months will be a strong test of the sincerity of an administration that has claimed on many occasions to be the most transparent in history.  The continuing obfuscation on Benghazi by administration officials up to and including the president is casting further doubt on that claim.

*Post originally said "State Department"

Note: A version of this article first appeared at The Weekly Standard.